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Abstract
This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy design.
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two sectors that produce durable and non-
durable goods, respectively. Part of the output produced in each sector is used as an intermediate
input of production in both sectors, according to an input-output matrix calibrated on the US
economy. As shown in a number of recent contributions, this roundabout technology allows us
to reconcile standard two-sector New Keynesian models with the empirical evidence showing co-
movement between durable and non-durable spending in response to a monetary policy shock.
A main result of our monetary policy analysis is that strategic complementarities generated by
factor demand linkages amplify social welfare loss. As the degree of interconnection between
sectors increases, the cost of misperceiving the correct production technology of each sector can
rise substantially. In addition, the transmission of di¤erent sources of exogenous perturbation is
altered, compared to what is commonly observed in standard two-sector models without factor
demand linkages. In this respect, the role of the relative price of non-durable goods is crucial, as
this does not only inuence the user cost of durables through the conventional demand channel,
but also a¤ects in opposite directions the real marginal cost of production in either sector through
the intermediate input channel.
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1
Introduction
This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy design. We build
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two sectors that produce durable and non-durable
goods, respectively. Goods produced in each sector serve either as a nal consumption good, or as an
intermediate production input in both sectors, according to an input-output matrix calibrated on the
US economy. The model can reproduce co-movement of value-added in both sectors in response to a
monetary-policy shock. As documented by various contributions (see, among others, Aoki, 2004; Erceg
and Levin, 2006; Barsky et al., 2007), co-movement between non-durable and durable goods spending
is an inherent feature of the US economy that multi-sector DSGE models need to replicate and that
raises a number of questions from the normative point of view.
Introducing factor demand linkages into otherwise standard general equilibrium models with durable
and non-durable consumption goods is of key importance for two main reasons. First, it is well doc-
umented that standard sticky-price models incorporating sectoral heterogeneity in price stickiness -
usually in the form of sticky non-durable goods prices and exible durables prices - cannot generate co-
movement between sectors (Barsky et al., 2007). Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo
(2008) show that this negative co-movement puzzle is not robust to a realistic feature of US data, that
is inter-sectoral linkages.1 These turn out to be crucial to restore co-movement between non-durables
and durables value added. Moreover, they act as a potent amplier of shocks to the system.2 However,
these papers limit their focus to model economies where there is no explicit stabilization role for a
benevolent central bank. Second, despite its empirical relevance, the role of the intermediate input
channel for the transmission of exogenous and policy induced shocks is generally neglected, as well as
the e¤ective degree of price rigidity across inter-dependent sectors.
Horvath (1998, 2000) shows that input materials can re-inforce the e¤ect of sectoral shocks, gener-
ating aggregate uctuations and co-movement between di¤erent sectors of the economy, due to the role
of strategic complementarities acting through the intermediate input channel. More generally, inter-
sectoral linkages are crucial to explain co-movement between macroeconomic aggregates.3 Horvath
(2000) shows how independent sectoral shocks have substantial impact on the volatility of aggregate
output in the presence of a delayed application of the law of large numbers. The underlying mecha-
nism is consistent with the propagation of sectoral shocks through the "sparse matrix"4 form of the
intermediate-input use and the capital-use tables in the US.5 Carvalho (2009) generalizes the results put
1As detailed by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008), input-output interactions are empirically important. Dale
Jorgensons data on input expenditures by US industries shows that materials (including energy) account for roughly
50 percent of outlays, while labor and capital account for 34% and 16%, respectively. The Input-Output (I-O) accounts
compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that 70 percent of the material-input expenditures by the
durables sector goes into goods produced by the nondurables sector. The converse proportion is around 10 percent,
which is much smaller but still not negligible. More generally, the US I-O matrix is far from being the perfectly diagonal
matrix that is implicitly assumed in models without inter-sectoral linkages.
2An alternative line of enquiry is followed by Monacelli (2008), who stresses the role of nancial market imperfections
in generating co-movement. He envisages a heterogenoeus agents setting according to which reletively more impatient
agents access to credit is constrained by the value of their collateral. The presence of this constraint de-links the
connection between the user cost of durables and their relative price, thus allowing to resolve the co-movement puzzle.
3Huang and Liu (2001) show that a model with a vertical input-output structure can reproduce characteristic patterns
of price movements at di¤erent stages of production and persistent responses of aggregate output following a monetary
shock.
4Horvath (1998, 2000) explores the role of inter-sectoral linkages in economies where sector-specic shocks represent
a source of aggregate uctuations. He shows that certain classes of input-output matrices transmit a shock in one sector
to the others. In particular, independent variations in the productivity of di¤erent sectors survive in the aggregate when
few full rows and many sparse colums characterize the input-output matrix. The presence of input materials re-inforces
the initial impulse, thus generating aggregate uctuations and co-movement between di¤erent sectors of the economy.
5Kim and Kim (2006) show that a similar mechanism generates widespread co-movement of economic activity (e.g.
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forward by Horvath (2000), showing that the strength of the propagation mechanism in a multi-sector
economy can be related to the degree of fat-tailness of the distribution of input-supply linkages in the
input-output matrix. Overall, these studies emphasize the need to reconsider the policy implications
drawn from otherwise standard multi-sector models at the light of role played by inter-sectoral linkages
in the transmission of macroeconomic uctuations.
We rst show that the central bank cannot attain the Pareto optimal allocation consistent with
the full stabilization of output and ination, even after removing sources of distortion in the labour
market (imperfect labour mobility6) and in the goods market (monopolistic competition). This result
generalizes the one obtained by Huang and Liu (2005) in a two-sector model with vertical input struc-
ture, where the Pareto optimal allocation can be attained only if sectoral shocks have exactly the same
magnitude or when no labour is required in the production of nal goods. In our variant model economy
the occurrence of sectoral shocks of the same magnitude does not ensure that these o¤set each other,
given the presence of a roundabout technology. Unless no labour input is employed in the production
process, the Pareto optimum is attainable only when the sectoral shock bu¤eting the non-durable goods
sector equals the one bu¤eting the durable goods sector, scaled by a factor that depends on the rela-
tive labour income share in the two sectors. We conclude that bi-directional horizontal factor demand
linkages impose a more restrictive set of conditions to the full stabilization of the model economy in
the face of exogenous shocks, compared to models characterized by a vertical input structure.
We then explore optimal monetary policy under the assumption that the policy maker can credibly
commit to an interest rate rule derived from the minimization of a social welfare function. Following
Rotemberg andWoodford (1998), we obtain a quadratic approximation to the household utility function.
We show that the welfare criterion assumed by the central bank balances, along with sectoral ination
variability, uctuations in aggregate consumption. This is a distinctive feature of our model, given that
a non-trivial di¤erence arises between consumption and production, due to factor demand linkages. The
relative importance of sector-specic ination variability is not only determined by the relative degree
of sectoral price stickiness, but also by the steady state ratio of labour supplied in the non-durable
goods sector on the total labour force (), which proxies the relative size of each sector. As  tends to
zero, meaning that in the steady state no labour is supplied to non-durable goods producing rms, the
relative weight of the terms pertaining to this sector vanishes.
Importantly, deriving a second-order approximation for the components of welfare associated with
the durables sector involves an additional term that reects an attitude to smooth the accumulation of
the stock of durable goods. This constitutes a primary objective for the monetary authority, compared
to the relative weight of other terms involved in the period loss. This feature of the social welfare
function is not stressed by Erceg and Levin (2006), although their loss function is isomorphic to the
one obtained in this paper.
A main contribution of this paper is to show how the introduction of factor demand linkages into an
otherwise standard two-sector model with durable and non-durable goods amplies social welfare loss,
compared to the benchmark economy without input materials. Crucially, as the actual importance of
factor demand linkages increases, the cost of misperceiving the correct production technology of each
sector can be substantial. Factor demand linkages alter the transmission of exogenous perturbations to
the system. A distinctive feature of our model is that a technology shock to either sector also a¤ects
potential output in the other sector, even if preferences into di¤erent types of goods are separable,
as assumed by Erceg and Levin (2006). In addition, the presence of input materials implies that the
in employment) across sectors. See also Hornstein and Praschnik (1997).
6Empirical evidence suggests that labor and capital are not perfectly mobile across sectors. Davis and Haltiwanger
(2001) nd limited labor mobility across sectors in response to monetary and oil shocks. Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-
Murcia (2008) report evidence suggesting that perfect labor mobility across sectors, with its implication that sectoral
nominal wages are the same, is an imperfect characterization of the data.
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relative price of non-durable goods does not only e¤ect the marginal rate of substitution between durable
and non-durable consumption, but also exerts a positive (negative) e¤ect on the real marginal cost in
the durable (non-durable) goods sector. We explore this feature of the model under optimal monetary
policy. A technology shock in the non-durable goods sector determines a rise in the relative price gap,
thus inducing stronger inationary pressures in the durable goods sector, compared what is commonly
observed in the baseline scenario without input materials. The amplication of the initial impulse due
to the presence of strategic complementarities between sector translates into strong aggregate price
ination, whose stabilization represents a prohibitive task for the central bank.
Another feature of the model with factor demand linkages deserves attention. In the face of a cost
push shock to either sector, the intermediate input channel acts as an endogenous attenuator of the
deationary e¤ect in the sector which is not hit by the shock. This works through the opposite impact
that the relative price exerts on sectoral marginal costs. Imperfect labour mobility magnies this e¤ect,
as it implies that input materials become a primary mechanism of endogenous adjustment in the system,
provided that these can ow between the two sectors without encountering any real friction.
We nally explore the welfare properties of the system under a wide set of alternative policy regimes,
whereby the monetary authority selects an alternative policy objective, compared to the specication of
the welfare criterion consistent with the model economy. Concurrently, we study the e¤ect induced on
strict and exible ination targeting regimes by di¤erent denitions of the price index, thus considering
"core" and "aggregate" ination.7 Regardless of the presence of input materials, when sectoral cost
push shocks bu¤et the model economy along with technology shocks, core ination targeting is (by far)
outperformed by every alternative regime we consider.8 More importantly, a exible ination targeting
regime, whereby the central bank balances uctuations in aggregate (or core) ination with those in
the real value added delivers a welfare loss close to the one attained under optimal monetary policy.
This result emphasizes the distinction between consumption and production that naturally arises in
frameworks with horizontally integrated sectors of production.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the theoretical setting; Section
2 describes equilibrium dynamics; Section 3 discusses the Pareto optimal outcome from the perspective
of monetary policy design; Section 4 derives a utility-based objective function of a benevolent central
bank; Section 5 discusses the implementation of optimal monetary policy, and compares deadweight
welfare loss under commitment with the loss attainable under number of alternative policy objectives.
Last section concludes.
1 The Model
We build a two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The model economy is populated
by a large number of innitely lived households. Each of them is endowed with one unit of time and
derives utility from consumption of durable goods, non-durable goods and leisure. The two sectors in
the economy are characterized by factor demand linkages. Goods produced in each sector serve either
as a nal consumption good, or as an intermediate production input in both sectors. The size of the
intermediate input ow from one sector to the other depends on the input-output structure, which is
characterized by the o¤-diagonal elements of the input-output matrix.
7The two concepts are coincident when sectors have the same size and nominal rigidity.
8As it is well known, this result stands in contrast to the common view put forward, among others, by Aoki (2001)
and Woodford (2003). In particular, Woodford (2003) shows that in a two-sector model with technology shocks as the
sole source of exogenous perturbation, optimal commitment policy is nearly replicated by an ination targeting regime,
where the weights attached to sectoral inations depend on the relative degree of nominal stickiness.
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1.1 Producers
Consider an economy that consists of two distinct sectors producing durable (sector d) and non-durable
goods (sector n). Each of these sectors is composed by a continuum of rms producing di¤erentiated
products. Let Y nt (Y
d
t ) denote the gross output of the non-durable (durable) goods sector, as composed
by the di¤erentiated goods produced by rms indexed by j (k):
Y nt =
Z 1
0
 
Y njt
 "nt  1
"nt dj
 "nt
"nt  1
Y dt =
"Z 1
0
 
Y dkt
 "dt 1
"dt dk
# "dt
"dt 1
(1)
where "it (i = fn; dg) denotes the time-varying elasticity of substitution of di¤erentiated goods in the
production composite. The composite products are produced in an aggregation sector operating under
perfect competition. It is possible to show that the aggregation sector expresses the following demand
for goods produced by rm j in sector n and by rm k in sector d, respectively:
Y njt =

P njt
P nt
 "nt
Y nt Y
d
kt =

P dkt
P dt
 "dt
Y dt ; (2)
where P nt and P
d
t are the prices of the composite good in the non-durable and in the durable goods
sector respectively. From (1) and (2) the relation between rm-specic and sectoral prices reads as:
P nt =
Z 1
0
 
P njt
1 "nt dj 11 "nt P dt = Z 1
0
 
P dkt
1 "dt dk 11 "dt : (3)
In our model economy sectors are related by factor demand linkages. Therefore, the composite output
of sector i = fn; dg serves partly as a consumption good and partly as an intermediate input in either
sector. The allocation of output produced in sector n requires that:
Y nt = C
n
t +M
nn
t +M
nd
t ; (4)
where Cnt denotes the production of sector n consumed by the households, M
nn
t represents the inter-
mediate inputs produced in sector n and consumed in the production process of the rms in the same
sector, while Mndt is the aggregate quantity of intermediate goods produced in sector n used in the
production process of the rms in sector d. Symmetrically, the allocation of output in sector d requires:
Y dt = C
d
t +M
dn
t +M
dd
t : (5)
The production technology of a generic rm f in sector i reads as:
Y ift = Z
i
t
" 
Mnift
ni  Mdiftdi

ni
ni 
di
di
#i  
Lift
1 i ; i = fn; dg (6)
where Zit (i = fn; dg) is a sector specic productivity shock, Liftdenotes the number of hours worked in
rm f in sector i, M jift (j = fn; dg) denotes material inputs produced in sector j and supplied to rm
f in sector i. It is important to stress that the durable goods sector actually produces "services from
durables" that only consumers can accumulate.9 Material inputs are combined according to a CES
9In Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo (2008) durables used as intermediate inputs are also modeled
as fully depreciating goods on the production side. The BLS in the US publishes two di¤erent input-output tables: (i)
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aggregator:
M jift =
Z 1
0
 
M jikf;t
("jt 1)="jt dk"jt=("jt 1) ; (7)
where

M jikf;t
	
k2[0;1] is a sequence of intermediate inputs produced in sector j by rm k, that are
employed in the production process of rm f in sector i.10
The generic element ab (a = fn; dg ; b = fn; dg) of the (2 2) input-output matrix,  , corresponds
to the steady state share of total intermediate goods used in the production of sector b supplied by
sector a. The input-output matrix is normalized, so that the elements of each column sum up to one,
i.e.
P
i=fn;dg ni = 1 (and analogously
P
i=fn;dg di = 1).
Firms in both sectors are monopolistic competitors in the consumption goods markets and are price
takers in the input markets. They set prices given the demand functions reported in (2). Firms can
change prices with probability 1  i in each period. When they are able to do so, they set a price that
maximizes expected prots according to the following problem:
max
P ift
Et
1X
s=0
(i)s
t+s

P ift+s
 
1 +  i
 MCift+sY ift+s; i = fn; dg (8)
where 
t+s is the stochastic discount factor (consistent with the maximizing behavior of households,
reported in the next subsection),  i denotes lump sum subsidies to producers in sector i, while MCifs
denotes the marginal cost of production for the f th rm in sector i. The optimal pricing choice, denoted
by P
i
ft, given the sequence of

P nt ; P
d
t ; Y
n
t ; Y
d
t
	
, is:
P
i
ft =
"it
("it   1) (1 +  i)
Et
P1
s=0(
i)sMCift+sY
i
ft+s
Et
P1
s=0(
i)s
t+sY ift+s
; i = fn; dg : (9)
Notice that under exible prices (i = 0) and constant elasticities of substitution we would end up with
the standard result that price is obtained as a xed mark-up over the marginal cost:
P
i
ft =
"i
("i   1) (1 +  i)MC
i
ft; i = fn; dg : (10)
In any given period, each rm solves a cost minimization problem in order to meet demand at its stated
price. The rst order conditions from this problem result in the following set of relationships:
MCiftY
i
ft =
W itL
i
ft
1  i =
P nt M
ni
ft
ini
=
P dt M
di
ft
idi
; i = fn; dg : (11)
It is useful to express the sectoral real marginal cost as a function of the relative price, Qt = P nt =P
d
t ;
and of the sectoral real wage:
MCnt
P nt
=

n

Q
 dn
t
n
(RW nt )
1 n
Znt
; (12)
the "Input-use Table", which considers goods that fully depreciate in the same period they are produced, and are usually
referred to as "materials" in the traditional KLEM setting; (ii) the "Capital Flow Table" of the input-output accounts.
Our   is calibrated according to (i). It is important to stress that what we usually dene as durables producing sectors
(say e.g. automobiles) have non-zero entries in the "input-use" matrix.
10To semplify exposition we assume that the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of the same good, "jt ,
is the same for consumption goods and intermediate inputs.
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where RW nt = W
n
t =P
n
t is the real wage in sector n. Analogously, for the durable goods sector:
MCdt
P dt
=

d
(Q
nd
t )
d
 
RW dt
1 d
Zdt
: (13)
where RW dt = W
d
t =P
d
t . Notice that 
n
and 
d
are convolutions of the production parameters.
Therefore, the relative price of durable goods a¤ects the marginal cost of each sector in opposite
directions.11 Moreover, assuming time-varying elasticities of substitution results into di¤erentiated cost-
push shocks that allow us to account for sector-specic shift parameters in the New Keynesian Phillips
curves, whereas the relative price represents a common shifter to both supply schedules.12
1.2 Consumers
Households derive income from working in the production sector, investing in bonds and from the
stream of prots generated in the production sector. Their preferences are dened over a composite of
non-durable goods (Cnt ), an "e¤ective" stock of durable goods (Dt), and labour (Lt). They maximize
the expected present discounted value of their utility:
E0
1X
t=0
t

H1 t
1     %
L1+vt
1 + v

; (14)
where
Ht = (C
n
t )
n
D
d
t
and  is the discount factor, n and d denote the expenditure shares on non-durable and durable goods,
which are normalized such that they sum up to one,  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, v is the Frisch labour supply parameter. Durable goods are accumulated according to the
following law of motion:
Dt = C
d
t + (1  )Dt 1; (15)
where  denotes the depreciation factor. The e¤ective unit of durables scales the e¤ect of a cost of
adjustment:13
Dt = Dt   F (Dt; Dt 1) : (16)
Therefore, adjustment costs are implicitly included in the utility function. Specically, we rely on a
convex (quadratic) adjustment function, whose form is quite standard in the literature:14
F (Dt; Dt 1) =

2
(Dt  Dt 1)2
D
: (17)
11As it will emerge from our calibration, the absolute value of the marginal impact of changes in the relative price on
the sectoral marginal cost is higher in the durable goods sector, as n = d and nd  dn.
12However, notice that sectoral cost-push shocks exert an indirect e¤ect on the relative price through their inuence
on sectoral rates of ination.
13The inclusion of adjustment costs of the stock of durables is in line with the research on durable consumption over the
business cycle. Adda and Cooper (2000) provide evidence on the discrete nature of durables purchases at the individual
level. King and Thomas (2006) show how the partial adjustment mechanism helps at accounting for the aggregate e¤ect
of discrete and occasional microeconomic adjustment of a large number of heterogeneous consumers that face a xed
costs of consumption adjustment.
14See, e.g., Bernanke (1985).
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We assume that labour can be either supplied to sector n or d according to a CES aggregator:
Lt =
h
 
1
 (Lnt )
1+
 + (1  )  1  Ldt  1+ i 1+ ; (18)
where  indexes the elasticity of substitution in labour supply and  is the steady state ratio of labour
supply in the non-durable goods sector over total labour supply. This functional form allows us to
account for di¤erent degrees of labour mobility between sectors, depending on the value assumed by .
For  = 0 labour cannot ow between sectors, whereas for !1 we allow for perfect labour mobility.
Unlike Horvath (2000), this specication of the CES aggregator allows to neutralize the impact of labour
market frictions in the steady state.
The following sequence of (nominal) budget constraints applies:X
i=fn;dg
P itC
i
t +Bt = Rt 1Bt 1 +
X
i=fn;dg
W itL
i
t +
X
i=fn;dg
	it   Tt; (19)
where Bt denotes a one-period risk-free nominal bond remunerated at the gross risk-free rate Rt.
Moreover, Tt denotes a lump-sum tax paid to the government. The term 	nt +	
d
t captures the nominal
ow of dividends from both sectors.
Maximization of (14) subject to (19), (15), (16), and (17) leads to a set of rst-order conditions,
which can be re-arranged to obtain:
nH1 t (C
n
t )
 1 = RtEt
"
nH1 t+1
 
Cnt+1
 1
nt+1
#
; (20a)
nH1 t P
d
t
Cnt P
n
t
= Et

 (1  )nH
1 
t+1 P
d
t+1
Cnt+1P
n
t+1
+ (20b)
+
dH1 t
Dt

1  
D
(Dt  Dt 1)
 1 +  D dH1 t+1Dt+1 (Dt+1  Dt) 1
)
;
W nt
nH1 t (C
n
t )
 1
P nt
= % 
1
L
v  1

t (L
n
t )
1
 ; (20c)
W dt
nH1 t (C
n
t )
 1
P nt
= % (1  )  1 Lv 
1

t
 
Ldt
 1
 : (20d)
Thus, from (20c) and (20d): 

1  
  1


Lnt
Ldt
 1

=
W nt
W dt
: (21)
Notice that, for !1 (i.e., perfect labor mobility), sectoral nominal wages are equalized.
1.3 The Government and the Monetary Authority
We assume that the government serves two purposes in the economy. First, it delegates monetary
policy to an independent central bank. We assume that the short-term nominal interest rate is used as
the instrument of monetary policy, and that the policy maker is able to pre-commit to a time-invariant
rule. We consider alternative specications of the monetary policy rule, including both rules that can
be regarded as reasonable characterizations of recent historical experience (Section 2) and rules derived
from an explicit optimization problem of the benevolent central banker (Section 4).
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The second task consists of taxing households and providing subsidies to rms to eliminate distor-
tions arising from monopolistic competition in the markets for consumption goods. We assume that
this task is pursued via lump-sum taxes that maintain a balanced scal budget.
1.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation
Total production reads as:
Yt = Y
n
t + Y
d
t : (22)
The allocation of output produced by each sector requires that sectoral gross product is partly sold on
the consumption goods market, while a proportion is sold on the markets for input materials. Therefore,
(4) and (5) must hold jointly.
It is important to recognize that Cit and Y
i
t are not equivalent in our setting, given the presence
of intermediate inputs. In particular, Cit can be interpreted as value added in the i
th sector, while Y it
reects sectoral gross output.15 As sectoral gross output can be sold both on the intermediate goods
market or on the nal goods market, total production is typically greater than real value added. Thus,
according to our model economy Cit matches most closely the empirically relevant denition of real
GDP.
2 Solution and Calibration
To solve the model, we log-linearize private sectors behavioral equations and resource constraints
around the non-stochastic steady state and then take the deviation from their counterparts under exible
prices.16 The di¤erence between log-variables under sticky prices and their linearized steady state is
denoted by the symbol "^", while we use symbol "" to denote percent deviations of variables in the
e¢ cient equilibrium (i.e. exible prices and constant elasticities of substitution) from the corresponding
steady state value.17 Finally, we use symbol "~" to denote the di¤erence between linearized variables
under sticky and exible prices.18
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. We assume that the discount factor  = 0:993.
We assume that the preference parameter  = 1, which is consistent with balanced growth, as discussed
in Ngai and Pissarides (2007). The expenditure share on non-durable goods is n = 0:682. The Frisch
labour supply parameter (v) is set to 3, while we set the elasticity of substitution in labour supply
 = 1.19 The production parameters n = d = 0:6, while the entries of the two-sector input-use
matrix are nn = 0:899, nd = 0:688, according to the calibration of the US economy proposed by
Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008).20 This implies that the net ow of input materials from the
non-durable goods sector to the durable goods sector is positive. The depreciation rate of the stock
of durables is assumed at 2:5%.21 In the baseline calibration we assume that the degree of nominal
rigidity is the same across sectors, namely n = d = 0:75. We also explore the implications of allowing
15See also Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) on this distinction in multi-sector models with input materials.
16Steady state conditions are reported in Appendix A.
17The economy under exible prices is reported in Appendix B.
18The linearized system in extensive form is reported in Appendix C1. Appendix C2 reports the matrices of parameters
for the canonical form of the model.
19This value is in line with the calibration proposed by Horvath (2000).
20These shares were computed using the table "The Use of Commodities by Industries" for 1992 produced by the BLS.
Sudo (2008) shows that the composition of the matrix is quite stable over time.
21As in Erceg and Levin (2006), this choice reects that the durables sector in our model includes both consumer
durables and residential investment, which have quarterly depreciation rates of about 5% and 0.75%, respectively, and
that the expenditure share of consumer durables in the composite is about two-thirds.
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for asymmetric degrees of price stickiness between the two sectors. We assume that sectoral elasticities
of substitution have a steady state value equal to 11. Finally, we set the cost of adjusting the stock of
durable goods  = 600, as in Erceg and Levin (2006).
As discussed above, the system features two sector-specic technology shocks, znt and z
d
t . Exogenous
variables are assumed to follow a rst-order VAR:
zt = Pzt 1 + vt;
where zt =

znt z
d
t 
n
t 
d
t
0
, P is a diagonal matrix whose eigenvalues lie within the unit circle,
and vt is a vector of iid innovations, with diagonal contemporaneous covariance matrix.22 The cost-
push shocks, nt and 
d
t , are reduced form expressions for the time-varying cost-shift parameters in the
sectoral New Keynesian Phillips curves.
We choose the parameters describing the persistence and variance of the productivity growth sto-
chastic process in both sectors so that z
n
= z
d
= 0:95 and z
n
= z
d
= 0:02 respectively. These
values are in line with the standard business cycle literature.23 As to the cost push shocks, we fol-
low Jensen (2002), Walsh (2003) and Strum (2008), and assume that these are purely transitory, with

n
= 
d
= 0:02.
2.1 Equilibrium Dynamics and Co-Movement in the Face of a Monetary
Policy Shock
We briey discuss the most signicant dynamic features of the model before turning our attention to its
equilibrium dynamics under optimal monetary policy. To close the model at this stage, it is necessary
to specify how the monetary authority sets the nominal rate of interest. In the rst instance we consider
the following instrumental rule:24
brt = rbrt 1 + (1  r)t +  rt ;  > 1 and r  0 (23)
where  rt is an iid (0; 1) monetary policy innovation. The interest rate smoothing parameter 
r is set
to 0:7, while  = 1:5. We assume that the monetary authority responds to a convex combination of
sector-specic rates of ination. The according price index is dened as:
ept = epnt + (1  )epdt ; (24)
where the weights associated to sectoral inations capture the relative size of each sector and depend
on the steady state ratio of labour supplied in the non-durable goods sector on the total labour force
().
Figure 1 reports the e¤ect of a one-standard-deviation shock to the monetary policy rule (23) at
t = 0, for alternative values of the frequency of adjustment in durables prices (the degree of stickiness in
the non-durable sector is kept constant at four quarters). Factor demand linkages induce co-movement
in durable and non-durable goods spending.25 Durable and non-durable consumption decrease following
the monetary contraction and gradually return to their equilibrium level thereafter. As expected, the
22An alternative strategy would be to assume correlated innovations. This is not pursued, so as to avoid that co-
movement is generated through an exogenously postulated mechanism.
23These values are in line with Strum (2008) and are consistent with empirical studies that show how technology shocks
are generally small, but highly persistent (see, e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995; Gali, 1999; Huang and Liu, 2005).
24See di Pace (2008) for a sensitivity analysis to di¤erent types of instrumental rules.
25Not only value added, but also sectoral productions co-move. This feature of the model is in line with the evidence
discussed by Cristiano and Fitzgerald (1998) and Rebelo (2005).
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rst-round impact of the shock and the degree of persistence in the durable goods sector increases in the
degree of nominal rigidity. When input materials are excluded (n = d = 0) and prices in the durable
goods sector are exible, as reported in Figure 1, durable consumption increases, while non-durable
consumption mirrors its path in the opposite direction. This negative co-movement is induced by the
assumption of price exibility in the durables sector, as opposed to the assumption of price stickiness
in the non-durables sector, which implies that the relative price of durables decreases following the
initial monetary contraction.26 The economy reported in the right panel of Figure 1 behaves in line
with the multi-sector model ala Woodford (2003), where relative price only a¤ects the marginal rate
of substitution between di¤erent consumption goods. Notice that when input-output interactions are
switched o¤, imperfect labour mobility is not enough to generate co-movement in the face of a monetary
policy innovation. Thus, as discussed in Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008), imperfect labour
mobility and inter-sectoral linkages are mutually reinforcing elements in the transmission of monetary
policy innovations.27
In accordance to the empirical evidence discussed in the introduction,28 the sensitivity of durable
spending to the monetary innovation is larger than the one of non-durable spending, despite the in-
troduction of an adjustment cost of the e¤ective stock of durables. This e¤ect is more pronounced as
the degree of nominal rigidity in the durable goods sector increases. This results from two features of
this class of models, as detailed by Erceg and Levin (2006): (i) rstly, durables demand is for a stock,
so that changes in the stock amplicate changes in the ow demand for newly produced goods; (ii)
secondly, sectoral price rigidities mitigate the role that changes in the relative price (of durables) play
in insulating the durables sector from exogenous perturbations. In Section 4 we show that these factors
have clear-cut implications for optimal monetary policy design.
3 The Pareto Optimum
Removing sources of distortion in the labour market (imperfect labour mobility) and in the goods
market (monopolistic competition) represents a desirable situation for a benevolent central banker. At
this stage of the analysis we are interested to understand whether, after removing these frictions, the
monetary authority can attain a rst best allocation where output gap and ination in both sectors
are jointly stabilized. As in Huang and Liu (2005), the answer to this question is negative for general
parameter values and shock processes, but the structure of the economy imposes a di¤erent explanation
for this outcome. We consider a variant economy without cost-push shocks and perfect labour mobility.
The following proposition formalizes our results.
Proposition 1 In the model with sticky prices and where labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, there
exists no monetary policy that can attain the Pareto optimal allocation, unless the shock bu¤eting
the non-durable goods sector is equal to the one bu¤eting the durable goods sector scaled by a factor
(1  n) = (1  d).
26Monacelli (2008) explains that a baseline two-sector New Keynesian model cannot replicate such e¤ects, since asym-
metric price stickiness in the two sector model means that whenever consumption contracts in one sector following a
monetary tightening, it would expand in the other. This is due to the fact that with perfect markets the shadow value of
durables (i.e. the discounted stream of marginal utilities of durables) is roughly constant. As a result, durable spending
is highly sensitive to variations in the user cost. If durable goods prices are exible and non-durables prices are sticky, a
monetary contraction lowers the relative price of durables and subsequently the user cost, leading to opposite e¤ects in
the two sectors.
27Sudo (2008) shows that in a model with perfect labour mobility factor demand linkages are enough to generate
co-movement.
28See Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007), Erceg and Levin (2006) and Monacelli (2008).
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Proof. Suppose there were a monetary policy under which the equilibrium allocation under sticky prices
would be Pareto optimal. Then, in such an equilibrium, the gaps would be completely closed for every
period. That is, grmcnt = grmcdt = 0, 8t. It follows from the pricing conditions that nt = dt = 0, 8t.
Recall that the relative price evolves as:
eqt = eqt 1 + nt   dt  qt :
Since we also have that eqt = 0, the equation above implies that nt   dt = qt . It can be shown that
(see Appendix D for the derivation of the relative price in the e¢ cient equilibrium setting with perfect
labour mobility):
qt =
(1  d) znt   (1  n) zdt
1 + {
;
where
{ = nd(nn + dd   1)  nnn   ddd:
Therefore, it cannot be that nt = 
d
t = 0, unless q

t = 0, which translates into:
zdt
znt
=
1  d
1  n .
Assuming that durable and non-durable goods are partly used as input materials in both sectors is
crucial to these results. Allowing for imperfect labour mobility would only reduce the possibility for
the monetary authority to neutralize the real and nominal e¤ects of the technology shocks. Although
leading to the same fundamental conclusion of Huang and Liu (2005) that the Pareto optimal allocation
cannot be attained when labour is required in the production of both goods, a signicant di¤erence
arises. Our model features the presence of a roundabout production structure (0 < d; n < 1), whereas
Huang and Liu (2005) envisage vertically integrated sectors of production, with the intermediate goods
sector employing a constant returns to scale technology. In their case the Pareto optimum can be
achieved as long as the sectoral shocks are equal or when no labour is required in the production of
nal goods. In our case having the same shock in both sectors does not ensure that these wash out in
the aggregate, given the presence of a roundabout technology. Unless no labour input is employed in the
production process, the sole possibility to attain the Pareto optimum arises when then sectoral shock
bu¤eting the non-durable goods sector equals the one bu¤eting the durable goods sector, scaled by a
factor that depends on the relative labour income share in the two sectors. Therefore, bi-directional
horizontal factor demand linkages impose more restrictive conditions to the full stabilization of the
model economy in the face of exogenous shocks, compared to models characterized by a vertical input
structure.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
As shown in the previous section, the central bank cannot attain the Pareto optimal allocation even after
di¤erent sources of distortion in the labour and in the goods market are removed. Therefore, we turn our
attention to policy strategies capable to attain second best outcomes. We explore equilibrium dynamics
under the assumption that the policy maker can commit to a rule derived from the minimization of
his objective function. Optimal monetary policy consists of maximizing the conditional expectation of
intertemporal household utility subject to private sectors behavioral equations and resource constraints,
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as discussed by Woodford (2003).29,30 This policy regime constitutes a useful benchmark for assessing
the performance of alternative discretionary policy outcomes.
We measure social welfare as the conditional expectation of average household lifetime utility, in
deviation from its value under exible prices:31
SW0 = E0
1X
t=0
tfWt; (25)
where
Wt = H
1 
t
1     %
L1+vt
1 + v
: (26)
The second-order approximation of (26), derived in Appendix E1, follows the standard analysis of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), adapted to account for the presence of factor demand linkages. The
resulting social loss function reads as:
SW0   UH (H)H
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

   1


necnt + d edt2 + S edt   edt 12
+ &
h
$ (nt )
2 + (1 $)  dt 2i+ (1 + ) !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt 2o
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ; (27)
where:
S = d 1 + (1  ) (1  !)  2;
 =
n [1   (1  )] + d
1   (1  ) ;
! =
n [1   (1  )]
n [1   (1  )] + d ;
$ = "n (n&) 1 ;
& = "n (n) 1 + (1  ) "d  d 1 ;
i =
 
1  i  1  i
i
; i = fn; dg
and t.i.p. collects the terms independent of policy stabilization, whereas O
 kk3 summarizes all terms
of third order or higher.
Function (27) reveals that the welfare criterion assumed by the central bank balances, along with
sectoral ination variability, uctuations in aggregate consumption (or, equivalently, value added). This
is a distinctive feature of our model, which di¤ers from traditional multi-sector models where output
gap variability is generally accounted for in the loss function (see, e.g., Aoki, 2001 and Woodford,
29We pursue a timeless perspective approach, as in Woodford (1999). This involves ignoring the conditions that
prevail at the regimes inception, thus imagining that the commitment to apply the rules deriving from the optimization
problem had been made in the distant past. In this case, there is no dynamic inconsistency in terms of the central banks
own decisionmaking process.
30The system is solved for the evolution of the endogenous variables by reyling on the common practice discussed, e.g.,
by Sims (2002).
31We assume that the shocks that hit the economy are not big enough to lead to paths of the endogenous variables
distant from their steady state levels. This means that shocks do not drive the economy too far from its approximation
point and, therefore, a linear quadratic approximation to the policy problem leads to reasonably accurate solutions.
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2003). The introduction of input materials is crucial to this result, as it implies a non-trivial distinction
between output and consumption.
Approximating the terms of social welfare associated with the durables sector involves an additional
objective, which reects a strong preference to smooth the accumulation of the stock of durable goods.32
Quantitatively, this term constitutes a primary objective in this setting, compared to the weight of other
components of the period loss. Notice that the second term in S is extremely high and increases in the
degree of durability (i.e. decreases in ). Even though (27) is isomorphic to the social welfare function
derived by Erceg and Levin (2006), this feature is not stressed in their paper. The introduction of
convex adjustment costs ( > 0) re-inforces the relative importance of reducing uctuations in durables
accumulation further. Assuming durables accumulation smoothing as a prominent objective helps at
counteracting the amplication e¤ect of changes in the stock demand of durables on the ow demand
of newly produced durable goods.
The remaining weights associated to the time-varying terms in (27) can be interpreted as follows:
(i) & is a measure of the total degree of nominal stickiness in the economy, as it depends inversely from
d and n: the greater is price stickiness in a particular sector, the greater the relative importance of
that sectors ination rate in the loss function; (ii) $ accounts for the relative price stickiness in the
non-durable goods sector; (iii) ! represents the relative weight of non-durable consumption over total
consumption when durable goods are reported as a ow. This is an inverse function of . In turn,
 depends upon the degree of durability of goods produced in sector d. For  = 0 it reduces to n,
whereas for  = 1 it reduces to one. Therefore, as the degree of durability increases, the weight attached
to non-durables consumption gap increases compared to the one attached to the durable component.
Denote with Wn;dt

=1
the part of loss which depends on the consumption gap under the assumption
that consumption goods produced in sector d perish at a 100% rate: in this case households derive
utility from consuming two classes of non-durable goods, as ecdt = edt. Conversely, Wn;dt 
=0
denotes
the consumption-based component of deadweight loss under perfect durability. This implies that only
non-durable consumption is accounted for in the quadratic term derived from labour disutility, as ! = 1.
fWn;dt 
=1
=  UH (H)H
2
(1 + v)
 
nect + decdt 2 + t.i.p.+O  kk3 ; (28)
fWn;dt 
=0
=  UH (H)H
2
(1 + v)n (ecnt )2 + t.i.p.+O  kk3 : (29)
Notice also that the relative importance of sector-specic ination variability depends on the steady
state ratio of labour supplied in the non-durable goods sector on the total labour force (). As  tends
to zero, meaning that no labour is supplied to non-durable goods producing rms in the steady state,
the relative weight of the terms pertaining to this sector vanishes. Figure 2 maps the evolution of  for
di¤erent values of n and d. The contour map clearly shows that  increases along the main diagonal
of the subspace considered. The elasticity of  to changes in the production function parameters is
generally greater for d, as compared to the marginal impact of changes in n. When no input materials
are employed in both sectors (n = d = 0) the loss function reduces to the one obtained in traditional
two-sector models with no factor demand linkages between sectors (e.g. Woodford, 2003).
How do factor demand linkages inuence deadweight loss? The left panel of Figure 3 reports social
welfare dened over the subspace of the production parameters n and d when both technology and
cost-push shocks bu¤et the model economy. The right panel of Figure 3 reports analogous evidence
under the assumption that technology shocks are the only source of exogenous perturbation. The
general pattern suggests that social welfare decreases monotonically in the share of intermediate goods
32Details on this term are available in the technical appendix.
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used in the non-durable goods sector, whereas the share of input materials in the durable goods sector
exerts a negligible impact.
Yet, our main concern is not only on how factor demand linkages a¤ect welfare loss, but also on
how central banks misperception about their magnitude generates excess loss with respect to the
correctly specied model economy. To answer this question we implement optimal commitment policy
under the assumption that the central bank neglects the relevance of factor demand linkages in the
production process (n = d = 0). Table 1 reports the (percentage) excess loss under misperception of
the input-output structure with respect to the loss under the correctly specied production structure
of the economy. As the actual weight of factor demand linkages increases in both sectors, excess loss
can be substantial. Notice that the marginal impact - in terms of excess loss - of misperceiving n is
greater than the one associated to d, given that non-durable goods producers are the major suppliers
of intermediate inputs in our calibrated model economy.
4.1 Impulse-Response Analysis under Optimal Monetary Policy
Figure 4 reports equilibrium dynamics of the model economy following a one-standard-deviation shock
to productivity in the non-durable goods sector, while the e¤ects of an analogous shock in the durable
goods sector are reported in Figure 5. The graphs in the left panel report equilibrium dynamics with
factor demand linkages between sectors, whereas on the right side we consider the model with no input
materials (n = d = 0). Ination and interest rates are annualized. Symmetric nominal rigidity is
assumed, as n = d = 0:75.33
Both scenarios suggest that exogenous shocks are amplied in the presence of factor demand linkages.
A technology shock in the non-durable goods sector makes production of these goods relatively cheaper,
thus increasing their production and consumption. However, their price is prevented from reaching the
level consistent with the situation of exible prices. This determines a negative non-durable consump-
tion gap. As to the response of the central bank, the real interest rate (on non-durables) initially rises
in the model with no input materials, thus preventing output (and consumption) in the non-durable
sector from rising as much as it would under exible prices. Concurrently, real rates do not rise enough
to prevent output gap in the durables sector from rising too much. As discussed by Erceg and Levin
(2006), keeping output at potential in the non-durable goods sector requires a "sharp and persistent
fall" in the real interest rate. By contrast, a sharp rise in the policy instrument is required to keep out-
put at potential in the durable goods sector. This is exactly what happens in our variant economy with
no input materials. Conversely, in the model with factor demand linkages the real interest rate initially
decreases, gradually converging to its equilibrium level thereafter. Keeping output at potential in the
non-durable goods sector prevails over the alternative objective. This result is intimately related to
the existence of factor demand linkages, which amplify the e¤ect of the initial impulse on non-durable
output/consumption gap. Moreover, when input materials are employed in the production process,
durable consumption under exible prices increases, thus helping to reduce durables consumption gap.
This endogenous mechanism is not at work in the model without input materials, where durables con-
sumption under exible prices is not a¤ected by the shock, as a result of setting  = 1, which implies
separability of householdspreferences in durable and non-durable consumption.
A distinctive feature of the model with factor demand linkages deserves attention. When a round-
about technology is envisaged, the relative price does not only a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution
between durable and non-durable consumption. As reported in equations (12) and (13), Qt exerts a
33As in Strum (2008) we opt for this choice to prevent the central bank from focusing exclusively on the stickier sector
in the formulation of its optimal policy, as predicted by Aoki (2001). Thus, for the time being we avoid to favour a
stabilization objective over another. In the next subsections we draw implications from the model under asymmetric
degrees of nominal rigidity across sectors.
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positive (negative) e¤ect on the real marginal cost in the durable (non-durable) goods sector. A tech-
nology shock in the non-durable goods sector determines an increase in the relative price gap, which
implies a substitution away from non-durable to durable consumption goods. In addition, the interme-
diate input channel gives rise to higher inationary pressures in the durable goods sector through its
inuence on the real marginal cost. Conversely, the drop in the marginal cost of production of non-
durables and the negative value added (output) gap translate into a persistent deation in this sector.
These factors, combined with the expansionary policy pursued by the central bank, imply that the
inationary pressures developed in the sector producing durable goods are in absolute value stronger
than the deationary e¤ect experienced by non-durable goods prices. In turn, this determines rising
inationary pressures at the aggregate level.
Figure 6 reports equilibrium dynamics following a cost-push shock in the non-durable goods sector.
A distinctive feature of the model with factor demand linkages is that a cost push shock to non-durable
goods ination drives the relative price gap up. In turn, this element partially counteracts the de-
ationary e¤ect that is otherwise observed in the model without input-output interactions and that
operates through the conventional demand channel. The overall contractionary e¤ect is magnied by
the presence of factor demand linkages. This leads the central bank to initially pursue a weakly contrac-
tionary policy, accompanied by a negative real rate of interest (on non-durables). Notice the marked
discrepancy between the consumption and the production gap in each sector. Following the initial
shock, a drop in the demand of both nal and intermediate input goods takes place, which leads pro-
duction to fall by more than consumption. By contrast, following a sectoral technology shock, sectoral
production gaps (and value added gaps) co-move negatively under optimal monetary policy. Moreover,
a technology shock generally induces consumption to uctuate more than production. In fact, a drop
in the consumption gap of the sector that experiences the positive technology shock translates into a
drop in the demand gap of intermediate goods from the other sector. Thus, each sector experiences
opposite demand e¤ects on the markets for the consumption and the intermediate goods. Importantly,
imperfect labour mobility exacerbates this e¤ect, increasing the wedge between consumption and pro-
duction. When aggregate demand increases exogenously, as labour cannot ow across sectors without
frictions, rms need to increase intermediate inputs by more than they would under the assumption of
perfect labour mobility to meet the increased demand. Consequently, uctuations in production and
consumption are wider in the presence of imperfect labour mobility.
Monetary policy is weakly contractionary in the face of a positive cost-push shock to durable goods
ination in the model with input materials (Figure 7), whereas in the variant economy without input
materials we observe a substantial rise in the real interest rate (on non-durables). The optimal response
in the baseline scenario is accompanied by a small rst-round increase in the nominal rate of interest.
From this period onwards the policy instrument falls below its steady state level, and gradually returns
to equilibrium thereafter. Weakly contractionary monetary policy determines a positive non-durables
consumption gap in the model with factor demand linkages. In addition, non-durables deation is
counteracted by the presence of factor demand linkages, compared to the alternative scenario without
input materials. Thus, non-durables ination is substantially stable, given that the intermediate input
channel acts as an endogenous stabilizer. Concurrently, this policy strategy keeps durable goods con-
sumption closer to potential, compared to the alternative scenario with n = d = 0. This allows the
central bank to place higher attention on controlling uctuations in the consumption of the stock of
durables. If there were no incentive to smooth durable goods accumulation - meaning that S = 0 in
(27) - the policy response would be quantitatively closer to the one observed in traditional one-sector
models or in our variant multi-sector economy without factor demand linkages (Figure 8).
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4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy versus Alternative Policy Regimes
We now compare the relative performance of optimal monetary policy under commitment with respect
to a number of alternative policy regimes, using the second order welfare approximation (27) as a
benchmark. We compute the unconditional expected welfare loss as the percentage of steady state
aggregate consumption (and multiply the resulting term by 100).
The following alternative regimes are considered:34
fW 0t = nfWITt ;fWGTt ;fWFITt ;fWITDSt o ;
where fWITt corresponds to the period loss under strict core or aggregate ination targeting: in the rst
case the weights attached to sectoral inations depend on the relative degree of price rigidity, as well
as from the relative size of each sector and the degree of substitutability among di¤erentiated goods;
in the second case the weights attached to sectoral inations only depend on the relative size of each
sector.35 fWGTt denotes the period loss under gap targeting: this can be either consumption or output
gap targeting.36 fWFITt denotes the loss function under exible core or aggregate ination targeting,
whereby uctuations in core or aggregate ination are balanced together with a term that penalizes
uctuations in aggregate consumption (or production). Our focus on "exible" regimes is motivated by
the fact that an explicit trade-o¤ is introduced when considering sectoral cost-push shocks. Moreover,
given that the quadratic term associated to durable goods smoothing constitutes a prominent fraction
of the overall loss, it is relevant to consider a hybrid ination targeting regime, fWITDSt , given that strict
ination targeting might induce substantial volatility on the accumulation of the stock of durables.
As reported in Appendix F, either under a strict or a exible ination targeting,37 the volatility
of aggregate (or core) ination is accounted for, and not the volatility of sectoral inations separately.
This choice is motivated by two main considerations. First, from a quantitative viewpoint considering
the square term of either aggregate or core ination involves an additional term, compared to the
case where the central bank cares about uctuations in sectoral inations, which can be related to the
covariance between sectoral inations. This term is not otherwise accounted for in the second-order
welfare criterion derived in the paper. Second, from a strategic viewpoint we are willing to understand
whether the central bank can approximate the optimal outcome under commitment, without focusing
on "distinct" objectives, such as the sectoral rates of ination. In principle, this should enable the
monetary authority to provide the public with a more intelligible target, thus increasing the degree of
accountability on its policy mandate. Svensson (1997) stresses the importance of assuming intermediate
targets which are highly correlated with the goal, easy to control, and transparent, so as to enhance
communication to the public. In this sense measures of overall ination are meant to serve at this scope
better than sectoral inations. Moreover, considering unique measures of aggregate or core ination
allows us to partly address the criticism advanced by Nelson (2002), who suggests that aggregate
ination targeting might not be an undesirable policy regime in this class of multi-sector models, as
hinted by Erceg and Levin (2006).
Table 2 reports welfare loss under the optimal rule and various alternative policies. These are
disaggregated into the loss attributable to each component weighted in (27). To compare equilibrium
paths under alternative regimes, we evaluate the associated loss by taking as a benchmark our second-
order approximation of the social welfare function. Both technology and cost-push shocks are assumed
34The analytic specication of each regime is reported in Appendix F.
35Notice that, when n = d, the weights are such that  = L
n
L =
Y n
Y n+Y d
.
36Consumption gap targeting can be alternatively interpreted as value added targeting, given that the two concepts
are coincident in our setting.
37See Svensson (1999) for a distinction between "strict" and "exible" ination targeting.
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to bu¤et the model economy. We assume that sectors are symmetric in the degree of nominal rigidity
(n = 0:75, d = 0:75), therefore coret = 
agg
t . A exible ination targeting regime, whereby uctuations
in consumption or production are balanced along with aggregate ination, performs nearly as well as
optimal commitment policy. Importantly, the central bank attains a welfare loss closer to the one
under optimal monetary policy when uctuations in aggregate (or core) ination are balanced with
those in real value added, compared to the loss induced by controlling uctuations in the gross product.
The presence of factor demand linkages weakens the perfect correlation between consumption and
production. Selecting consumption as a stabilization objective in the hybrid ination targeting regime
allows the policy maker to achieve a close to optimal performance. This is also conrmed from the the
second-order approximation of consumersutility, where consumption variability arises as a stabilization
objective, and not production variability.
Table 3 reports the relative performance of alternative policies under various assumptions about
the sources of shocks. We consider both our benchmark model economy (n = d = 0:6) and a
model with no factor demand linkages (n = d = 0). As observed at di¤erent stages of the analysis,
deadweight loss is generally higher in the rst case. Concurrently, the presence of cost-push shocks
induces higher variability. Again, the exible ination targeting regime outperforms other alternative
regimes. As to strict ination targeting, it is worth noticing that this regime displays a "competitive"
performance only in the case with only technology shocks, as expected on a priori grounds. Moreover,
notice that output gap targeting constantly outperforms consumption gap targeting. Given the non
trivial distinction between production and consumption in the model with factor demand linkages,
targeting consumption gap volatility enables the central bank to control only "part" of the variability
in the marginal cost - and in turn its e¤ect on ination - compared to what obtained by targeting
the production gap, which also accounts for the role of factor demand linkages. In turn, also sectoral
ination volatility benets from this e¤ect (see Table 2, columns 3 and 4).
Table 4 considers the case of asymmetric price stickiness, in the form of durables prices being more
exible than non-durables prices (n = 0:75, d = 0:25).38 This allows us to introduce a distinction
between core and aggregate ination, as discussed earlier. We compare each regime under the as-
sumption that either only sectoral technology shocks bu¤et the model economy or in the presence of
sectoral cost-push shocks.39 Considering core ination targeting as an alternative to aggregate ination
targeting is somewhat related to a long-standing debate on the information that the central bank can
access when formulating its strategy. Woodford (2003) shows that in a two-sector model with no input
materials optimal commitment policy is nearly replicated by an ination targeting regime, whereby
the weights attached to sectoral inations depend on the relative degree of nominal stickiness.40 This
result can only be replicated in the presence of technology shocks, no matter whether factor demand
linkages are at work. When only cost-push shocks bu¤et the model economy, or when both sources of
exogenous perturbation are at work, core ination targeting is by far outperformed by every alternative
regimes. This results from the pronounced e¤ect that cost-push shocks exert on consumption, and is
38Bils and Klenow (2004) report higher frequency of price adjustment for consumer durables than services. Erceg and
Levin (2006) assume that non-durables and durables are equally sticky. By contrast, Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007)
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) develop models where durables prices are exible and non-durables prices are sticky.
Studies in the housing literature also assume that house prices are exible (for example, Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello,
2005).
39Notice that introducing both sources of exogenous perturbation would deliver a scenario similar to the case with only
cost-push shocks, as these typically dominate the e¤ect induced by technology shocks on equilibrium dynamics.
40Aoki (2001) shows that the welfare-theoretic loss function consistent with a multi-sector economy with heterogeneous
degrees of price stickiness attaches higher weight on variations sectoral prices characterized by higher stickiness. This
provides a theoretical basis for seeking to stabilize an appropriately dened measure of "core" ination rather than an
equally weighted price index. Benigno (2004) relies on this reasoning to argue that a monetary union would maximize
welfare by seeking to stabilize an index that does not weight the di¤erent countriesination rates strictly in proportion
to the size of their economies.
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further amplied in the presence of factor demand linkages. Focusing on the "stickier" sector under
core ination targeting implies that the central bank almost stabilizes ination in the non-durables
sector, at the cost of inducing high volatility on the remaining components of welfare loss, especially
on aggregate consumption. Our parameterization implies a marked degree of asymmetry in terms of
sectoral nominal stickiness ($ = 0:992), which in turn leads the central bank to focus exclusively on
non-durables ination.
4.3 On the Role of Sectoral Asymmetries
The main goal of this section is to examine the role of asymmetry in the degree of competition and in the
degree of price stickiness across sectors for the optimal weighting of sectoral inations and the resulting
welfare properties of the model economy. Our exercise is performed by varying the sectoral Calvo
parameters and the elasticities of substitution between goods produced within the same sector, under
the assumption that their aggregate counterparts are xed at values consistent with the symmetric
case.41
Given that the monetary policy authority operates in a timeless perspective, the resulting rule is
optimal no matter the nature of the (additive) exogenous disturbances that bu¤et the model economy,
as advocated by Giannoni and Woodford (2003). Thus, it is possible to analyze the e¤ect of sectoral
technology and cost-push shocks separately. Our results are reported in Figure 9. Specically, the
y-axis in each graph measures the stickiness gap and the x-axis reports the competitive gap, as dened
in Lombardo (2006).42 The exercise is performed both under the assumption that no input materials
are employed, as well as under our baseline calibration of the input-output matrix, i.e. n = d = 0:6.
On average, sectoral interaction determines an increase in the general level of deadweight loss for
di¤erent degrees of asymmetry in either dimension (price stickiness and degree of competition). This
result emerges both when only technology shocks are accounted for, as well as in the model with only
cost-push shocks. In the model with cost push shocks and in the presence of factor demand linkages
the loss is about 15% to 55% higher than that attainable without horizontal ows of input materials
between the two sectors. When only technology shocks are considered, excess loss ranges from 25% to
50%.
Model with Technology Shocks - We rst consider technology shocks as the sole source of
exogenous perturbation. Before turning to the analysis of asymmetry in our baseline model economy, it
is instructive to provide an overview of the e¤ects determined by each distinctive feature of the model
separately.43 We start by assuming a two-sector economy with sectors of equal size, no durability in
either of the goods produced, and no input-output linkages (i.e. n = d = 0,  = 1 and n = d =
! = ). In this case, the resulting loss function is concave in both dimensions of asymmetry. A
hump-shaped pattern emerges over the subspace considered. Thus, as asymmetry in either dimension
increases, overall unconditional variance decreases. This is in line with the evidence produced by Benigno
(2004), Lombardo (2006)44 and Woodford (2003), and is intimately related to the existence of a trade-
41We set  = 0:75 and " = 11, as in the baseline calibration with symmetric sectoral nominal stickiness and elasticities
of substitution in demand. Thus, we map the loss under optimal monetary policy for di¤erent values of the "nominal
rigidity gap" (n   d) and the "competition gap" ("n   "d), under the assumption that n + (1  ) d =  and
"n + (1  ) "d = ".
42Benigno (2004) performs a thorough analysis of the impact of asymmetry in the degree of nominal stickiness in a
monetary union on the welfare loss. Lombardo (2006) shows how asymmetries in the degree of competition can exacerbate
or mitigate the e¤ects of asymmetric nominal price rigidity.
43We only report a description of the evolution of deadweight loss under di¤erent parameterizations. The relative
graphs are not reported in the paper for reasons of space. These are available, upon request, from the authors.
44Lombardo (2006) shows that when prices are set in a staggered fashion, the amount of output dispersiongenerated
by a given deviation of prices from their average depends positively on the elasticity of substitution between goods (i.e.
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o¤ in the stabilization of sectoral inations. When sectors have same size and analogous production
characteristics, asymmetry in the degree of nominal stickiness and/or in the competition gap mitigates
this trade-o¤, as the monetary authority can focus on keeping ination under control in the sector
with higher weight in the index of core ination. This leads to a lower total deadweight loss and
derives from the combined e¤ect of: (i) higher e¤ectiveness of the policy action against uctuations in
the sector with higher price rigidity and/or higher elasticity of substitution in demand, and (ii) lower
price rigidity and/or lower elasticity of substitution in demand in the other sector, which respectively
imply lower ination persistence and lower cross-sectional dispersion in prices. When factor demand
linkages are introduced and sectors are of equal size (n = d = 0:6,  = 1 and n = d) the loss is
still symmetric over the spectrum of the "nominal rigidity gap", but decreases in the gap between the
elasticity of substitution of the sector that represents the main supplier in the economy (n) and the
one of the other sector (d). Due to the existence of factor demand linkages, ine¢ ciencies deriving from
nominal rigidities in either sector are partially passed through onto the other sector. This e¤ect helps
at counteracting the inuence of the "nominal rigidity gap" on welfare. Moreover, if the competition
gap is positive ("n > "d), then the weight attached to non-durable goods ination rises linearly in "n. In
this sense the monetary authority has to place higher attention on ination uctuations in this sector
(with respect to the symmetric case). Stabilizing uctuations in the price ination of the non-durable
goods sector amounts to reducing one of the main sources of uctuation in the marginal cost gap
of the durable goods sector, which acts through the intermediate input channel. When durability is
accounted for (n = d = 0:6,  = 0:025 and n = d), an additional objective emerges in the central
banks welfare criterion, which reects a rather strong preference for smoothing the accumulation of
the stock of durables. This incentive exacerbates the impact of nominal rigidities in this sector on total
deadweight loss, thus we observe that the loss function is generally increasing for d > n and "d > "n.
Eventually, under the baseline calibration of our model (n = d = 0:6,  = 0:025 and n = 0:682),
asymmetry in the degree of nominal stickiness exerts stronger marginal impact on the evolution of the
welfare loss. In particular, for a given level of asymmetry in sectoral competition, optimal monetary
policy involves placing greater weight on the "stickier" sector. The minimum loss is attained when the
economy is characterized by the both the highest competitive gap and the highest asymmetry in the
degree of nominal stickiness over the parameter subspace considered, and specically when the non-
durable goods sector is more competitive and "stickier". Notice that, given the relative size of the two
sectors, in order to keep aggregate stickiness at a xed level, a marginal increase in n is accompanied
by a more than proportional decrease in d. Analogous observations apply to the sectoral degrees of
competition. Higher n and "n mean that the central bank penalizes inationary pressures relatively
more in the broader sector of our model economy.
Model with Cost-Push Shocks - In the remainder we only consider the model under the baseline
calibration reported in Section 2. The introduction of sectoral cost-push shocks induces a trade-o¤
between output and ination stabilization. Total welfare decreases in the degree of asymmetry in
nominal stickiness and competition between sectors. This can be explained intuitively. As it can be
observed in (27), the Calvo parameters indexing the degree of nominal rigidity in either sector enter
non-linearly in the component of loss associated with uctuations in core ination. By contrast, the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced in either sector only a¤ects the relative weight of core
ination with respect to other objectives, namely$. The trade-o¤between ination and consumption is
such that ination volatility induced by the sector-specic cost-push shocks is not completely stabilized
by the monetary authority. Consequently, the contour map tracks the pattern of $ in the subspace
dened over the asymmetry gaps. In particular, $ evolves convexically with respect to the nominal
rigidity gap, with a minimum occurring at zero, and increases (decreases) for n > (<) d.
the degree of competition in our model). Therefore, the country with the largest degree of competition is the one that
generates the greatest cost of ination.
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Model with Technology and Cost-Push Shocks - The analysis of the loss function in the
presence of both sources of exogenous sectoral perturbation suggests that the monetary authority faces
an easier task in the stabilization of the variability due to the technology shocks, compared to its
performance in the presence of cost-push shocks. Moreover, provided that cost-push shocks produce a
non-trivial trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilization, they have a predominant impact on the
pattern of the welfare loss. This is clearly displayed in the last panel of Figure 9, where aggregate loss
is generally convex with respect to the nominal rigidity gap, whereas the e¤ect of the competition gap
is negative (positive) when the nominal rigidity gap is positive (negative).
5 Conclusions
We have integrated a roundabout production structure into a dynamic general equilibrium model where
two sectors produce durable and non-durable goods. Part of the output produced in each sector is used
as an intermediate input of production in both sectors, according to an input-output matrix calibrated
on the US economy. This implies a non-trivial di¤erence between consumption (or, equivalently, value
added) and gross product, given the presence of input materials. The resulting input-output interactions
have non-negligible implications for the formulation of policy recommendations aimed at reducing real
and nominal uctuations in the economy. The intermediate input channel generally amplies the e¤ects
of exogenous perturbations to the system and alters the transmission mechanism, compared to standard
multi-sector models. A key role is played by the relative price of non-durable goods, which acts not only
as an allocative mechanism on the demand side, through its inuence on the user cost of durable goods,
but also on the supply side, through its competing e¤ects on sectoral marginal costs of production.
The social welfare function derived through a second-order approximation of households utility
reveals that the policy maker is faced with the task of stabilizing uctuations in sectoral inations and
aggregate value added. In addition, a term reecting a strong preference for smoothing the accumulation
of the stock of durable goods arises in the welfare criterion. This results as a primary objective of the
central banker, no matter whether convex costs are assumed for adjusting the e¤ective stock of durable
goods. Factor demand linkages amplify overall deadweight loss. In particular, as the actual importance
of factor demand linkages increases in both sectors, the cost of misperceiving the correct production
structure of each sector can be substantial.
A distinctive feature of the model with input materials under optimal commitment policy is that,
in the face of a cost push shock to either sector, the intermediate input channel acts as an endogenous
stabilizer that attenuates the deationary e¤ect in the sector which is not hit by the shock. This
mechanism works through the opposite impact that the relative price exerts on sectoral marginal costs.
Finally, we explore the welfare properties of the system under a wide set of alternative policy regime,
whereby the monetary authority selects a "restricted" policy objective, compared to the specication
of the welfare criterion consistent with the model economy. Importantly, a exible ination targeting
regime, whereby the central bank balances uctuations in aggregate or core ination with those in
real value added delivers a welfare loss close to the one attained under optimal monetary policy. This
emphasizes the distinction between consumption and production that naturally arises in frameworks
with horizontally integrated sectors of production.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES MISPERCEPTION
TECH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 4.664 22.468 52.119
0:3 2.348 1.012 14.763 41.453
0:6 17.232 0.906 5.713 27.242
0:8 49.424 8.468 1.160 17.336
COST PUSH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 2.984 9.400 16.554
0:3 3.904 1.234 4.970 10.061
0:6 28.415 11.303 10.324 13.976
0:8 92.084 45.841 36.050 38.283
BOTH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 3.075 10.210 18.322
0:3 3.552 1.209 5.601 11.267
0:6 25.684 8.912 9.517 14.037
0:8 77.991 30.982 27.664 35.721
Note: We report the percentage excess loss under misperception of the input-output structure with respect to the
loss under the correctly specied production structure of the economy, for di¤erent shocks.
TABLE 2: WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Loss Components
edt nt dt xt Total
Optimal Policy 0.0417 0.6477 0.2918 0.2274 1.2086
Ination Targeting 0.5486 0.0785 0.3472 2.6662 3.6405
Ination Targeting (with Durable Smoothing) 0.1937 0.2486 0.3043 1.0450 1.7916
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.0234 1.6396 0.4026 0.0000 2.0656
Production Gap Targeting 0.0133 1.5380 0.3721 0.0067 1.9300
Flexible Ination Targeting (with Consumption) 0.0476 0.6360 0.2900 0.2377 1.2113
Flexible Ination Targeting (with Output) 0.0121 1.1501 0.3234 0.0243 1.5099
Note: edt refers to the durable smoothing objective, and xt to aggregate consumption (value added). The welfare loss
is computed as the percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (multiplied by 100).
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TABLE 3: WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLICIES AND DIFFERENT PRODUCTION STRUCTURES
MODEL WITH FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES (n = d = 0:6)
Tech. Shocks Cost Push Shocks Dur. Sec. Shocks Non-Dur. Sec. Shocks
Optimal Policy 0.1741 1.0645 0.2686 0.9658
Ination Targeting 0.1768 3.5025 0.3891 3.3110
Ination Targeting (with Dur. Smoot.) 0.1862 1.6418 0.2884 1.5459
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.2016 1.9235 0.2881 1.8400
Production Gap Targeting 0.1758 1.7903 0.2957 1.6749
Flex. Ination Targeting (with Cons.) 0.1753 1.0654 0.2957 0.9665
Flex. Ination Targeting (with Prod.) 0.1744 1.3664 0.2823 1.2581
MODEL WITHOUT FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES (n = d = 0)
Tech. Shocks Cost Push Shocks Dur. Sec. Shocks Non-Dur. Sec. Shocks
Optimal Policy 0.1156 0.6897 0.2854 0.5152
Ination Targeting 0.1166 0.8662 0.3028 0.6778
Ination Targeting (with Dur. Smoot.) 0.1157 0.7890 0.2911 0.6111
Output Gap Targeting 0.1217 1.6498 0.4196 1.3670
Flex. Ination Targeting 0.1163 0.6907 0.2856 0.5168
Note: The rst two columns report the loss attributable to technology shocks and cost-push shocks in both generated
in both sectors, respectively. The last two columns report the loss due to both shocks in either sector. The welfare loss
is computed as the percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (multiplied by 100).
TABLE 4: ASYMMETRY IN PRICE STICKINESS
Tech. Shocks Cost Push Shocks
Optimal Policy 0.0388 0.8648
Core Ination Targeting 0.0391 3.6864
Agg. Ination Targeting 0.2000 1.3171
Core Ination Targeting (with Dur. Smoot.) 0.0389 2.0198
Agg. Ination Targeting (with Dur. Smoot.) 0.1822 1.1883
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.0408 1.6711
Production Gap Targeting 0.0396 1.6575
Flex. Core Ination Targeting (with Cons.) 0.0402 0.8654
Flex. Agg. Ination Targeting (with Cons.) 0.0936 0.8757
Flex. Core Ination Targeting (with Prod.) 0.0396 1.1855
Flex. Agg. Ination Targeting (with Prod.) 0.0463 1.1517
Note: We set the average duration of the non-durable goodsprices at 4 quarters, whereas we reduce the duration of
durable goods prices to 1.3 quarters (d = 0:25). The welfare loss is computed as the percentage of steady state
aggregate consumption (multiplied by 100).
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FIGURE 1: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A MONETARY POLICY TIGHTENING
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Note: We employ the following instrumental rule brt = rbrt 1+(1  r)t+ rt , where  rt is an iid (0; 1) monetary
policy innovation and the constant term involving the ination target has been suppressed for simplicity. The interest
rate smoothing parameter r is set to 0:7, while  = 1:5. We assume that the monetary authority responds to a
convex combination of sector-specic rates of ination.
FIGURE 2: LABOR INCOME SHARE IN THE NON-DURABLE GOODS SECTOR ()
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FIGURE 3: WELFARE UNDER OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY FOR DIFFERENT n AND d
TECHNOLOGY AND COST-PUSH SHOCKS ONLY TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS
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Note: The left panel of Figure 3 reports the welfare loss dened over the subspace of the production parameters in the
two sectors when both technology and cost-push shocks bu¤et the model economy. The right panel reports analogous
evidence under the assumption that technology shocks are the only source of exogenous perturbation.
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FIGURE 4: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK IN THE NON-DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by factor demand
linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 5: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK IN THE DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by factor demand
linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 6: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A COST PUSH SHOCK IN THE NON-DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by factor demand
linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 7: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A COST PUSH SHOCK IN THE DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by factor demand
linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 8: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A COST PUSH SHOCK IN THE DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
Optimal Commitment Policy with no Durables Accumulation Smoothing, S = 0:
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by factor demand
linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 9: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRY ON WELFARE LOSS
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Note: We set  = 0:75 and " = 11, as in the baseline calibration with symmetric sectoral nominal stickiness and
elasticities of substitution in demand. Thus, we map the loss under optimal monetary policy for di¤erent values of the
"nominal rigidity gap" (n   d) and the "competition gap" ("n   "d), under the assumption that n+(1  ) d =
 and "n + (1  ) "d = ".
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APPENDIX A: Some Useful Steady State Relationships
As in the competitive equilibrium real wage in each sector equals the marginal product of labor. Thus,
we can derive the following relationship between the production in non-durable and durable goods in
the steady state:
Y n
Y d
=
(1  d)
(1  n) (1  )Q
 1:
Furthermore, the following relationship between durable and non-durable consumtpion can be derived
from the Euler conditions:
Cn
Cd
= (1   (1  )) 
n
d
1

Q 1.
Moreover, the following shares of consumption and intermediate goods over total production are deter-
mined for the non-durable goods sector:
Cn
Y n
=
(1  nnn) (1  d)  (1  n) (1  )dnd
 (1  d) ;
Mnn
Y n
= nnn;
Mnd
Y n
=
(1  n)

1  
1  ddnd:
Analogously, for the durable goods sector:
Cd
Y d
=
(1  ddd) (1  ) (1  n)  (1  d)ndn
(1  ) (1  n) ;
Mdn
Y d
=
1  d
1  

1  nndn;
Mdd
Y d
= ddd:
These condtions turn out to be crucial in the second order approximation of consumersutility, in order
to eliminate linear terms. Moreover, they allow us to derive the steady state ratio of labour supply in
the non-durable goods sector over the total labour supply ().
The Relative Price in the Steady State
We consider the steady state condition for the marginal cost in the non-durable goods sector:
MCn = n

(P n)nn
 
P d
dnn (W n)1 n ;
n = 
n
n (1  n)1 n :
As in the steady state production subsidies neutralize distortions due to imperfect competition:
P n = MCn
= n

(P n)nn
 
P d
dnn (W n)1 n :
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After some trivial manipulations it can be shown that:
nQ
 ndn (RW n)1 n = 1:
Analogously, for the durables goods sector:
dQ
dnd
 
RW d
1 d = 1:
Using the fact that in steady state W n = W d = W :
RW n
RW d
Q = 1;
( 1n Q
ndn)
1
1 n 
 1d Q dnd
 1
1 d
Q = 1:
Therefore:
Q =

1 dn 
 (1 n)
d
 1
'
;
' = (1  n) (1  d) + ndn (1  d) + dnd (1  n) :
Notice that, when n = d = 1:
Q = n
 1
d
as in the case considered by Huang and Liu (2005) and Strum (2008).
APPENDIX B: Equilibrium Dynamics in the E¢ cient Equi-
librium
In this appendix we outline the solution method of the linear model under the e¢ cient equilibrium.
This is obtained when both prices are exible and elasticities of substitution are constant. Let us start
from the pricing rule under exible prices:
P n

t =
n
1 + n
MCn

t
=
n
1 + n

n  
P n

t
nn  P dt dnn  W t 1 n
Znt
P d

t =
d
1 +  d
MCd

t
=
d
1 +  d

d  
P n

t
nd  P dt ddd  W t 1 d
Zdt
where n and d denote the mark-up terms. In log-linear form the conditions above reduce to:
(1  n) rwnt = znt + ndnqt (30)
(1  d) rwdt = zdt   dndqt (31)
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We now recall some conditions under exible prices from the linearized system:
cdt =
1

dt  
1  

dt 1; (32)
rwnt =  cnt   (1  )ddt +

v (1  )  1


ldt
+

#+
1


lnt ; (33)
lnt = 
 
rwnt   rwdt + qt

+ ldt ; (34)
ynt =
Cn
Y n
cnt +
Mnn
Y n
mnnt +
Mnd
Y n
mndt ; (35)
ydt =
Cd
Y d
xt +
Mdn
Y d
mdnt +
Mdd
Y d
mddt ; (36)
0 = rwnt + l
n
t   ynt ; (37)
0 = rwdt + l
d
t   ydt ; (38)
0 = mnnt   ynt ; (39)
0 = mndt + q

t   ydt ; (40)
0 = mdnt   qt   ynt ; (41)
0 = mddt   ydt ; (42)
where # =
 
v   1


,  = (1  )n   1 and  = Ln
L
. We substitute (30) and (31) into (36) and (37)
respectively:
lnt = y
n
t  
1
1  n z
n
t  
ndn
1  n q

t ; (43)
ldt = y
d
t  
1
1  d z
d
t +
dnd
1  d q

t : (44)
We can use conditions (34), (35), and (39)-(42), to get:
ynt =
Cn
Y n
cnt +
Mnn
Y n
ynt +
Mnd
Y n
 
ydt   qt

and
ydt =
Cd
Y d
cdt +
Mdn
Y d
(qt + c
g
t ) +
Mdd
Y d
ydt :
We can nd a VAR solution of this system, so that we can express ynt and y
d
t as a function of c
n
t , c
d
t
and qt :
A

ynt
ydt

= B

cnt
cdt

+qt ;
37
where
A =
"
1  Mnn
Y n
 Mnd
Y n
 Mdn
Y d
1  Mdd
Y d
#
=
"
Cn
Y n
+ M
nd
Y n
 Mnd
Y n
 Mdn
Y d
Cd
Y d
+ M
dn
Y d
#
;
B =

Cn
Y n
0
0 C
d
Y d

;
 =
"
 Mnd
Y n
Mdn
Y d
#
:
Thus, we obtain: 
ynt
ydt

= A 1B

cnt
cdt

+A 1qt ;
or equivalently:
ynt = aq

t + bc
n
t + ec
d
t ;
ydt = cq

t + dc
d
t + fc
n
t :
These can be plugged into (43) and (44) to obtain:
lnt = bc
n
t + ec
d
t  
1
1  n z
n
t +

a  ndn
1  n

qt (45)
ldt = dc
d
t + fc
n
t  
1
1  d z
d
t +

dnd
1  d + c

qt (46)
Thus, we can substitute everything into (33) and (30):
1 + v
1  n z
n
t + 1z
d
t = 2c
n
t   (1  )ddt + 3cdt + 4qt ; (47)
where:
1 =
v(1  )  1
(1  n) ;
2 =
 (vb  ) + f [v(1  )  1]

;
3 =
ve+ d [v(1  )  1]

;
4 =  
ndn (1 + v)
1  n +

v(1  )  1
(1  d)

dnd
1  d + c

+ av

:
In turn, we can plug (45), (46), (30) and (31) into (33):
5q

t =
1
1  n z
n
t  
1
1  d z
d
t  
k
(1 + )
 
cnt   cdt

(48)
where
5 =
a  c  
1 + 
 

ndn
(1  n) +
dnd
(1  d)

:
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Conditions (47) and (48), together with the Euler conditions for the durable and the non-durable goods,
and the law of accumulation for durable goods, allow us to determine a system of linear di¤erence
equations. Equlibrium dynamics under exible prices can be reported in canonical form as:
Et

F0

t+1 + F1

t + F2

t 1 +C1$t

= 0 (49)
t =

cnt c
d
t d

t q

t rr

t
0
$t =

znt z
d
t
0
and
F0 =
2664
025
  0   (1  )d 012
 (1  ) [(1  )n   1] 0 F (4;3)0 0   (1  )
015
3775 ;
F
(4;3)
0 = 

(1  ) (1  )d +  [1   (1  )]	
F1 =
2666664
F
(1;1)
1 F
(1;2)
1 (1  )d F (1;4)1 0
k
(1+)
  k
(1+)
0 F
(2;4)
1 0
 0 (1  )d 0  1
[1   (1  ) (1  )n] 0 F (4;3)1 1 0
0 1  1

012
3777775 ;
F
(1;1)
1 =  

#+
1


b+    # (1  ) f;
F
(1;2)
1 =  # (1  ) d 

#+
1


e;
F
(1;4)
1 =  
ndn
1  n

1 +

#+
1


+ # (1  )

dnd
1  d + c

+ a

#+
1


;
F
(2;4)
1 =
a  c  
1 + 
  ndn
(1  n)  
dnd
(1  d) ;
F
(4;3)
1 =  

1 +  (1  ) (1  )d   1	   (1 + ) [1   (1  )]
F2 =
24 035012  [1   (1  )] 012
012 1  012
35 ;
C1 =
264 1+#+
1

1 n
#(1 )
1 d  1
1 n
1
1 d
032
375 :
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Moreover, (49) can be re-written to include all the shocks vt as
Et

F0

t+1 + F1

t + F2

t 1 +C1vt

= 0 (50)
with
C1 =

C1 052

:
APPENDIX C1: Log-linear Economy
Here we report the log-linear economy in extensive form:
ecnt = 1  brt   Etnt+1   rrt + Etecnt+1 + (1  )d Etedt+1;
ecnt = 1n (1  )

1  d (1  ) edt + 1
1   (1  )
h
(n (1  )  1)ect + d (1  ) edt   eqti+
  (1  ) 
[1   (1  )]
h
(n (1  )  1)ecnt+1 + d (1  ) edt+1   eqt+1i+
+
edt   edt 1  edt+1   edto
ecdt = 1 edt   1   edt 1;frwnt =  ecnt   (1  )d edt + # (1  )eldt + #+ 1
elnt ;
elnt = frwnt   frwdt + eqt+ eldt ;
nt = Et
n
t+1 +
(1  n) (1  n)
n
grmcnt + nt ;
dt = Et
d
t+1 +
 
1  d  1  d
d
grmcdt + dt ;eynt = nnn emnnt + ndn emdnt + (1  n)elnt ;eydt = dnd emndt + ddd emddt + (1  d)eldt ;eynt = CnY necnt + MnnY n emnnt + MndY n emndt ;eydt = CdY decdt + MdnY d emdnt + MddY d emddt ;grmcnt = frwnt + elnt   eynt ;grmcdt = frwdt + eldt   eydt ;grmcnt = emnnt   eynt ;grmcdt = emndt + eqt   eydt ;grmcnt = emdnt   eqt   eynt ;grmcdt = emddt   eydt ;eqt = eqt 1 + nt   dt  qt :
where  = (1  )n   1.
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APPENDIX C2: The Model in Canonical Form
The log-linear system in canonical form reads as:
Et
h
A0et+1 +A1et +A2et 1 +A3brt +A4t +A5t 1 +B1vti = 0; (51)
vt = Pvt 1 + et; (52)
where
et = h ecnt eynt ecdt eydt edt frwnt frwdt nt dt eqt i0 ;
t =

cnt c
d
t d

t q

t rr

t
0
;
vt =

znt z
d
t 
n
t 
d
t
0
:
The matrices of parameters are:
A0 =
266666664
  013   d(1 ) 1 012 1 012
(1  )  013 A(2;5)0 014   (1  )
0310
017   012
018   0
0310
377777775
A
(2;5)
0 = 

(1  ) (1  )d +  [1   (1  )]	
A1 =
2666666666666666664
 013
d
(1 ) 1 015
 013 A
(2;5)
1 014 1
012 1 0  1 015
 1 #

0 #
( 1) 1
d
(1 ) 1
+(1+#)n

#d
(1 ) 1 012 A
(4;10)
1
0  1 0 1 0 (n + )   (d + ) 012 (ndn + dnd + )
015  n (1  n) 0 1 0 nndn
016  d (1  d) 0 1  ddnd
 Cn
Y n
 
1  Mnn
Y n

0  Mnd
Y n
0   (1 n)Mnn
Y n
  (1 d)Mnd
Y n
012 A
(8;10)
1
0  Mdn
Y d
 Cd
Y d

1  Mdd
Y d

0   (1 n)Mdn
Y d
  (1 d)Mdd
Y d
012 A
(9;10)
1
017  1 1 1
3777777777777777775
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A
(2;5)
1 =  

1 +  (1  ) (1  )d   1	   (1 + ) [1   (1  )]
A
(4;10)
1 =  # (1  )dnd +

#+
1


ndn
A
(8;10)
1 =  
Mnd
Y n
(dnd   1) +
Mnn
Y n
ndn
A
(9;10)
1 =  
Mdn
Y d
(1  ndn) 
Mdd
Y d
dnd
n =
(1  n) (1  n)
n
d =
 
1  d  1  d
d
 = [1   (1  ) (1  )n]
A2 =
2664
0210
014 1  015
0610
019  1
3775
A3 =
  1
091

A4 =
24 014 1085
013 1 0
35
A5 =

095
013  1 0

B1 =
2664
054
012  1 0
013  1
034
3775
Closing the Model with an Instrumental Policy Rule
Assume that the central bank settles the interest rate according to a simple rule of the form:
rt = t
For instance, we can assume that:
rt = 

!nt + (1  !)dt

;
 =

017 ! (1  !) 0

:
Dene:
t =

0t rt
0
:
Thus (51) can be rewritten as:
Et

A0t+1 +A1t +A2t 1 +A4

t +A5

t 1 +B1vt

= 0
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A0 =

A0 0101
0111

A1 =

A1 0101
  1

A2 =

A2 0101
0111

A4 =

A4
015

A5 =

A5
015

B1 =

B1
014

Following Sims (2002), we cast the model in the following form:
 0yt = c+  1yt 1 +	zt +t (53)
where c is a vector of constant terms, zt is an exogenously evolving, possibly serially correlated, random
disturbance, and t is an expectational error, such that Et(t+1) = 0, 8 t. Moreover:
yt =
266664
vt
t
Ett+1
t
Et

t+1
377775 ; 	=
266664

0114
0114
054
054
377775 ; =
266664
0416
01116
I11 0115
0516
0511 I5
377775 ;
 0 =
266664
I4 0411 0411 045 045
B1 A1 A0 A4 0115
0114 I11 01111 0115 0115
C1 0511 0511 F1 F0
054 0511 0511 I5 055
377775 ;
 1 =
266664
P 0411 0411 045 045
0114  A2 01111  A5 0115
0114 01111 I11 0115 0115
054 0511 0511  F2 055
054 0511 0511 055 I5
377775 ;
 = diag

z
n
z
d

n

d

:
The t terms are not given exogenously. Instead, they are determined as part of the model solution.
Models with more lags, or with lagged expectations, or with expectations of more distant future values,
can be accommodated in this framework by expanding the y vector.
APPENDIX D: Relative Price in the E¢ cient Equilibrium
with Perfect Labour Mobility
We now dene the e¢ cient equilibrium in the model with no frictions in both the goods and the labour
market. On the labour market this condition, obtained for  ! 1, ensures that nominal salaries are
equalized across sectors of the economy:
W n

t = W
d
t = W

t : (54)
Moreover, given the production subsidies that eliminate sectoral distortions due to monopolistic com-
petition:
P n

t =MC
n
t P
d
t =MC
d
t . (55)
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Conditions (54) and (55) imply that:
P n

t =


n
 1
1 nnn  P dt  ndn1 nnn  W t  1 n1 nnn (Znt )  11 nnn ; (56)
P d

t =


d
 1
1 ddd  P nt  dnd1 ddd  W t  1 d1 ddd  Zdt   11 ddd : (57)
We then substitute (56) into (57) to eliminate W

t : 
P n

t
#n
= (1 nnn)(1 d)
 
P d

t
#d (Znt ) (1 d)  Zdt (1 n)
where
 =


n
 1
1 nnn


d
  1
1 d
1 n
1 nnn
and
#n = #d = (1  d) (1  nnn) + (dnd) (1  n) :
Thus, after some trivial algebra we can show that the relative price reads as:
Qt =
P n

t
P d

t
= 
h
(Znt )
 (1 d)  Zdt 1 ni 1{+1
= 
h
(Znt )
 (1 d)  Zdt 1 ni 1{+1 :
where
{ = nd(nn + dd   1)  nnn   ddd:
APPENDIX E1: Second Order Approximation of the Utility
Function
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), we derive a well-dened welfare function from the utility
function of the representative household:
Wt = U (Cnt ; Dt)  V (Lt) :
We start from a second order approximation of the utility from consumption of durable and non-durable
goods:
U (Cnt ; Dt)  U (Cn; D) + UCn (Cn; D) (Cnt   Cn) +
1
2
UCnCn (C
n; D) (Cnt   Cn)2 (58)
+UD (C
n; D) (Dt  D) + 1
2
UDD (C
n; D) (Dt  D)2 + 1
2
UD (C
n; D) (Dt  Dt 1)2
+UCnD (C
n; D) (Cnt   Cn) (Dt  D) +O
 kk3 ; (59)
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where O
 kk3 summarizes all terms of third order or higher. Notice that:
UD (C
n; D) =
 
dCn=nD

UCn (C
n; D) ;
UCnCn (C
n; D) = [n (1  )  1] (Cn) 1 UCn (Cn; D) ;
UDD (C
n; D) =

d (1  )  1  dCn=nDUCn (Cn; D) ;
UCnD (C
n; D) = d (1  )D 1UCn (Cn; D) :
As C
n
t  Cn
Cn
= bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2, where bcnt = log CntCn is the log-deviation from steady state under sticky prices,
we obtain:
U (Cnt ; Dt)  U (Cn; D) + UCn (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2

+
+
1
2
[n (1  )  1]UCn (Cn; D)C
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2
2
+
+UD (C
n; D)D
bdt + 1
2
bd2t+ 12 d (1  )  1UD (Cn; D)D
bdt + 1
2
bd2t2 +
+
1
2
UD (C
n; D)D
bdt   bdt 12 +
+d (1  )UC (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2
bdt + 1
2
bd2t+ t.i.p.+O  kk3 ;
where t.i.p. collects terms independent of policy stabilization.
Next, we introduce a second order approximation to the transition law for the stock of durables.
This will substitute out the linear term for durables in the expression above (see Erceg and Levin,
2006). The law of motion reads as:
Dt = (1  )Dt 1 +Xt:
For a general function F (Y;X) the second orer Taylor approximation can be written as:
F (Y;X)  FY (Y;X)Y y + FX (Y;X)Xx+ 1
2
 
FX (Y;X)X + FXX (Y;X)X
2

x2
+
1
2
 
FY (Y;X)Y + FY Y (Y;X)Y
2

y2 + FY X (Y;X)Y Xxy:
Now, we can rewrite the accumulation equation as:
F (Dt 1; Cdt ) = log

(1  )Dt 1 + Cdt

:
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Therefore:
FD =
(1  )
(1  )D + Cd =
(1  )
(1  )D + D =
(1  )
D
;
FCd =
1
(1  )D + Cd =
1
D
;
FDD =   (1  )
2
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
(1  )2
D2
;
FCdCd =  
1
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
1
D2
;
FDCd =  
1  
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
1  
D2
:
Considering that in the steady state Cd = D:
bdt  (1  )
D
D bdt 1 + 1
D
Dbcdt +
+
1
2
"
(1  )
D
D   (1  )
2
D2
D2
# bd2t 1 +
+
1
2

1
D
D   1
D2
D2
 bcdt 2   1  D2 bdt 1bxt
 (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt + (1  ) 2 bd2t 1 + (1  ) 2  bcdt 2   (1  ) 2 bcdt bdt 1
 (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt + (1  ) 2 bdt 1   bcdt2 :
Thus:
bdt  (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt +  t; (60)
where:
b t = (1  ) 2 bcdt   edt 12
=
(1  )
2
bdt   edt 12 :
Now, let us iterate backward (60), to obtain:
P1
t=0 
t bdt = 1
1   (1  )d0 +
P1
t=0 
t


1   (1  )bcdt + 11   (1  )b t

:
In turn, the term on the RHS will replace the one on the LHS into the intertemporal loss function.
The next step is to derive a second-order approximation for from labour disutility. Recall that:
blt = blnt + (1  )bldt :
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Therefore the second order approximation reads:
V (Lt)  VL (L)L

blnt + (1  )bldt +  (1 + 2)2 blnt 2 + (1  ) [1 + 2 (1  )]2 bldt2

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 :
After these preliminary steps, we need to nd an expression for blnt and bldt . Given the denition of the
marginal cost, in equilibrium we get:
Lnt =
(1  n)MCnt
W nt
1Z
0
Y njtdj =
(1  n)n
Znt
 
Q
 dn
t
RW nt
!n
Y nt
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj;
Ldt =
(1  d)MCdt
W dt
1Z
0
Y dktdk =
(1  d)d
Zdt

Q
nd
t
RW dt
d
Y dt
1Z
0

P dkt
P dt
 "dt
dk:
Thus, we can report the linear approximation of the expressions above:
blnt =  ndnbqt   ncrwnt   znt + bynt + Snt;bldt = dndbqt   dcrwdt   zdt + bydt + Sdt;
where:
Snt = log
24 1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj
35 Sdt = log
24 1Z
0

P dkt
P dt
 "dt
dk
35 (61)
If we set bpnjt to be the log-deviation of PnjtPnt from its steady state, which means that a second-order Taylor
expansion of
1Z
0

Pnjt
Pnt
 "nt
dj reads as:
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj 
1Z
0

1  "nbpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 ("n)2  bpnjt2

dj +O
 kk3
= 1  "nEibpnjt   "nEibpnjtb"nt + 12 ("n)2Ei  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 ;
where Eibpnjt  1Z
0
bpnjtdj and Ei  bpnjt2  1Z
0
 bpnjt2 dj. At this stage, we need an expression for Eibpnjt: Let
us start from
P nt =
Z 1
0
 
P njt
1 "nt dj 11 "nt ;
which can be re-arranged as:
1 
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
1 "nt
dj:
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Following the procedure above, it can be shown that:
P njt
P nt
1 "nt
 1 + (1  "n) bpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 (1  "n)2  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Substituting this into the preceeding equations yields:
0 =
1Z
0

(1  "n) bpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 (1  "n)2  bpnjt2

dj +O
 kk3 ;
which reduces to:
Eibpnjt = "n   12 Ei  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Thus:
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj = 1 +
"n
2
Ei
 bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Now, notice that:
Ei
 bpnjt2 = Ei h pnjt2   2pnjtpnt + (pnt )2i+O  kk3 ;
where lower case letters denote the log-value of the capital letters. Here we can use a rst-order
approximation of pnt =
1Z
0
pnjtdj, as this term is multiplied by other rst-order terms each time it appears.
With this, we have a second order approximation:
Ei
 bpnjt2  varjpnjt:
Combining all of this the second-order approximation can be represented as:
Snt =
"n
2
varjp
n
jt +O
 kk3 :
Analogous steps in the sector producing durable goods lead us to:
Sdt =
"d
2
varkp
d
kt +O
 kk3 :
Following Woodford (2003, Ch. 6, Proposition 6.3), we can obtain a correspondence between cross-
sectional price dispersions in the two sectors and their ination rates:
varjp
n
jt = 
nvarjp
n
jt 1 +
n
1  n (
n
t )
2 +O
 kk3 ;
varkp
d
kt = 
dvarkp
d
kt 1 +
d
1  d
 
dt
2
+O
 kk3 :
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Iterating these expressions forward leads to:
1X
t=0
tvarjp
n
jt = (
n) 1
1X
t=0
t (nt )
2 + t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ; (62)
1X
t=0
tvarkp
d
kt =
 
d
 1 1X
t=0
t
 
dt
2
+ t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ; (63)
where
n =
(1  n) (1  n)
n
;
d =
 
1  d  1  d
d
:
After these preliminary steps, we can write Wt as:
Wt  UCn (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 [n (1  )] (bcnt )2 +  d=n bdt +
+
1
2

d (1  )  d=n bd2t + d (1  )bcnt bdt + 12  d=n bdt   bdt 12

+
 VL (L)L
n
blnt + (1  )bldt+
+

1 + 
2

2
blnt 2 + (1  )bldt2 + 2 (1  )blnt bldt +
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 :
We now consider the linear terms in Wt, which are collected under LW t:
LW t = UCn (C
n; D)Cn
n
n
nbcnt + d bdto+
 fVL (L)L ( ndnbqt   ncrwnt + bynt ) +
+ (1  )

dndbqt   dcrwdt + bydt o+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
We subsitute for the real wage from marginal cost expressions to get:
LW t = UCn (C
n; D)Cn
n
n
nbcnt + d bdto+
 VL (L)L

1
1  n bynt   nnn1  n bmnnt   ndn1  n bmdnt

+
 VL (L)L (1  )

1
1  d bydt   dnd1  d bmndt   ddd1  d bmddt

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
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After substituting the second order approximation for the accumulation equation of durables we get:
1X
t=0
tLW t = UCn (Cn; D)Cn
1X
t=0
t
bcnt + 1   (1  ) dnbcdt

+ (64)
 VL (L)L
1X
t=0
t



1
1  n bynt   nnn1  n bmnnt   ndn1  n bmdnt

+
+(1  )

1
1  d bydt   dnd1  d bmndt   ddd1  d bmddt

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
Notice that the following linear approximations for the market clearing conditions hold:
bynt = 1  n nbcnt + nnn bmnnt + (1  n) (1  ) (1  d) dnd bmndt ;
bydt = d (1  d)(1  ) [1   (1  )]bcdt + (1  d)(1  ) (1  n)ndn bmdnt + ddd bmddt :
It can be shown that, in the steady state, the following relationships hold:
VLn (L
n)Ln = VL (L)L VLd
 
Ld

Ld = (1  )VLL (L)
Moreover, the presence of production subsidies allows us to express the steady state marginal rate of
substitution between labour supply and consumption of non-durable goods as:
 VLn (Ln)
UCn (Cn)
=
Y n (1  n)
Ln
;
 VLd
 
Ld

UCn (Cn)
=
Y d (1  d)
LdQ
:
It is now convenient to express the marginal utility from non-durable consumption in terms of the
marginal utility derived from total consumption:
UCn (C
n) = UH (H)H
n:
Therefore, we can re-write (64) as:
1X
t=0
tLW t = UH (H)H
1X
t=0
t

nbcnt + d1   (1  )bcdt

+
 n

Cn
Y n
 1
(1  n) [ ndnbqt   ncrwnt   znt + bynt ] +
 n

Cn
Y d
 1
(1  d)Q 1
h
dndbqt   dcrwdt   zdt + bydt i
)
+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
It is now possible to show, given the linearized market clearing conditions in the two sectors, thatP1
t=0 
tLW t = 0. Therefore, the linear term in Wt can be dropped. Thus we are left only with second
50
order terms:
1X
t=0
tWt  UH (H)H
1X
t=0
t

1  
2

nbcnt + d bdt2 + 11   (1  )db t + d2 bdt   bdt 12 +
 
2
h
"n (n) 1 (nt )
2 + (1  ) "d  d 1  dt 2i+
 

1 + 
2

 1

nbcnt + d1   (1  )bcdt
2)
+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ;
where
 =

Cn
Y n
 1
(1  n)n

=
n [1   (1  )] + d
1   (1  ) :
We next consider the deviation of social welfare from its Pareto-optimal level:
1X
t=0
tfWt = 1X
t=0
t (Wt  Wt ) 
 UH (H)H
2

1X
t=0
t

   1


necnt + d edt2 +
+

d 1 + (1  ) (1  !)  2 edt   edt 12 +
+&
h
$ (nt )
2 + (1 $)  dt 2i+ (1 + ) !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt 2o+ t.i.p.+O  kk3 ;
where the following notation has been introduced:
! =
n [1   (1  )]
n [1   (1  )] + d ;
$ =
"n (n) 1
&
;
& = 
"n
n
+ (1  ) "
d
d
:
APPENDIX E2: General Model Setup for Optimal Monetary
Policy Analysis
The welfare function can be written in matrix form as:
SW0 =  UH (H)H
2
E0
1X
t=0
t fX0tWXt + brtRbrtg ; (65)
where the state vector is augmented to include the past stock of durables:
Xt =
h

0
t
edt 1 i0 ;et = h ecnt eynt ecdt eydt edt frwnt frwdt nt dt eqt i0 :
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Notice that R = 0 in (65). Moreover, we dene
W = K0QK
where Q is a diagonal matrix and K reports the weighting coe¢ cients included in the loss function:
K =
266664
n 013 d 016
012  1 017 1
017 1 012 0
018 1 0 0
n 013 1 (1 )
d 016
377775 ;
Q = diag
h
(   1) ; d + (1  ) (1  !)  2 ; "n (n) 1 ; (1  ) "d  d 1 ; (1 + ) i :
To tackle the optimization problem we follow Dennis (2007) and consider the system under its structural
(singular) form:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t fX0tWXt +
+ 20t

G0Xt+1 +G1Xt +G2Xt 1 +G3rt +G4t +G5

t 1 +N1vt
	
:
For t > t0 the following conditions hold:
@L
@t
= Et

G0Xt+1 +G1Xt +G2Xt 1 +G3rt +G4t +G5

t 1 +N1vt

= 0;
@L
@Xt
= WXt +G
0
1t + 
 1G00t 1 + G
0
2Et (t+1) = 0;
@L
@rt
= G03t = 0:
Notice that the last condition suggests that the multiplier associated with the IS curve, ISt , is equal
zero. The matrices of the system now read as:
G0 =

A0 0101
0110 0

; G1 =

A1 0101
0110 1

;
G2 =

A2 0101
b 0

; b =

014  1 015

;
G3 =

A3
0

; G4 =

A4
015

;
G5 =

A5
015

; N1 =

B1
015

:
Following Sims, under the commitment optimal policy the economy evolves according to:
 0yt =  1yt 1 + c+	zt +t t = 1; : : : ; T (66)
where c is a vector of constants, zt is an exogenously evolving, possibly serially correlated, random
disturbance, and t is an expectational error, satisfying Et(t+1) = 0, all t. The t terms are not
given exogenously, but instead are treated as determined as part of the model solution. Models with
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more lags, or with lagged expectations, or with expectations of more distant future values, can be
accommodated in this framework by expanding the y vector. Specically, the whole model can be cast
in the form above by writing:
yt =
266666666664
vt
Xt
rt
EtXt+1
t
Et

t+1
t
Ett+1
377777777775
;  =
2666666664
01527
I11 01116
0527
0511 I5 0511
01127
01116 I11
0127
3777777775
; 	=


0554

;
 0 =
266666666664
I4 0411 041 0411 045 045 0411 0411
N1 G1 G3 G0 G4 0115 01111 01111
0114 I11 0111 01111 0115 0115 01111 01111
C1 0511 051 0511 F1 F0 0511 0511
054 0511 051 0511 I5 055 0511 0511
0114 W 0111 01111 0115 0115 G01 G
0
2
0114 01111 0111 01111 0115 0115 I11 01111
014 0111 011 0111 015 015 G03 0111
377777777775
;
 1 =
266666666664
P 0411 041 0411 045 045 0411 0411
0114  G2 0111 01111  G5 0115 01111 01111
0114 01111 0111 I11 0115 0115 01111 01111
054 0511 051 0511  F2 055 0511 0511
054 0511 051 0511 055 I5 0511 0511
0114 01111 0111 01111 0115 0115   1G00 01111
0114 01111 0111 01111 0115 0115 01111 I11
014 0111 011 0111 015 015 0111 0111
377777777775
;
where  =diag

z
n
z
d

n

d

.
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APPENDIX F: Alternative Policy Regimes
The following alternative regimes are considered in Section 4.3:
fWITt =  ITt 2 ;fWGTt =  exGTt 2 ;fWFITt = fWITt + (1 + v)fWGTt ;fWITDSt = fWITt + S edt2 ;
where
ITt = fcoret ; aggt g
coret = $
n
t + (1 $)dt ;
aggt = 
n
t + (1  )dt ;
and
exGTt = fexct ; exptgexct = !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt ;expt = eynt + (1  ) eydt :
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